Research

My research interests comprise a fairly broad set of topics that could be classified as international relations. I am especially interested in understanding the relationship between economics and conflict. This includes the economic foundations of war, the use of economic tools to influence the outcomes of international disputes, and the resolution of economic conflict. I also find the interaction between domestic politics and international relations to be fascinating. My interest in this area has led to a number of productive cross-subfield collaborations, which I hope to continue in the future.

Below, you can find some of the projects on which I'm currently working. If you are interested in my published works, you can find them here.

Military Service in Political Appointees

This is a data collection project funded by the National Science Foundation (Grant #2116045), which aims at compiling cross-national information on the military backgrounds of cabinet officials and department heads in the post-war era.

Election Accomplished: Democracies and the Timing of Peacekeeper Drawdowns (with Burak Giray)

Under review

We look at how elections affect the decisions of troop-contributing countries to continue participating in or withdraw from UN peacekeeping missions. We demonstrate the existence of heterogenenous effects, that depend upon the contributing country's domestic political institutions.

How the United States Builds International Coalitions and Compensates Partners: Evidence from Economic Sanctions (with Kerim Can Kavakli)

Under review

We use measures of market power to examine U.S. sanctioning coalitions. We argue that the United States seeks partners that can complement its economic leverage over the target state, and that it devises compensations schemes that benefits partners that either hold significant power over the target state or are particularly vulnerable to countersanctions.

Insurgents' Power to Hurt and Civil War Outcome (with Kerim Can Kavakli)

We argue that the willingness of a government to make concessions to a rebel group depends upon the economic pain that the insurgents can inflict. We combine georeferenced battle data with data on nighttime light emissions to demonstrate that those groups that attack more valuable areas are more likely to have their demands met by the government.

How Intermediate Trade May Help Bypass the Enforcement of Sanctions: Evidence From The United States (with Aydin B. Yildirim)

We argue that the willingness of a government to make concessions to a rebel group depends upon the economic pain that the insurgents can inflict. We combine georeferenced battle data with data on nighttime light emissions to demonstrate that those groups that attack more valuable areas are more likely to have their demands met by the government.

Military Combat and Attitudes Toward the Use of Force (with Jonathan D. Klingler)

We use novel survey data to distinguish between types of military service among American veterans. We then examine how prior exposure to combat affects respondents' opinions about the use of military power abroad.